After months of political upheaval, South Korea’s new Lee Jae-myung government entered office with ambitious climate promises. The administration reorganized the Ministry of Environment and several other agencies into the Ministry of Climate, Energy, and Environment (MCEE), and the new minister pledged to achieve 100GW of renewable energy by 2030 alongside President Lee’s pledge to phaseout coal by 2040. Yet, the bold rhetoric of the early months has since given way to hesitation, raising questions about how firmly Korea intends to position itself as a true climate leader. 

The UNFCCC’s Conference of the Parties (COP) offers perhaps the most visible platform for countries to demonstrate climate ambition. This year’s COP30 in Belém, Brazil, carries particular significance as countries are expected to submit new Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) for 2035. On November 17, Minister Sung-hwan Kim announced a target range of 53-61% emissions reductions compared to 2018 levels for the 2035 NDC. 

The 2035 NDC announcement does not come as a surprise due to recent developments prior to the COP announcement, which has been heavily criticized. Rather than committing to a clear target, officials have floated a “range” of possible emissions reductions. At a public hearing on November 6, the government outlined options of 50-60% or 53-60% cuts from 2018 levels. Just days later on November 9, the government adopted a slightly higher range of 53-61% in a Cabinet meeting.  

The government claims these numbers reflect public and civil society input. Yet, a recent report by Solutions for Our Climate (SFOC) and We Mean Business Coalition (WMBC) finds that meeting South Korea’s 2050 carbon neutrality goal requires cutting emissions by at least 61% by 2035. This figure comes from a joint study by SFOC and the University of Maryland, which found that Korea could follow this pathway under a high-ambition scenario. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the UN’s top scientific body on climate, the world must cut greenhouse gas emissions by around 60% by 2035, relative to 2019 levels, to stay on track for the 1.5°C goal set by the Paris Agreement. Korea’s proposed range of 53–61% reductions therefore sits at the very bottom of what would be considered a Paris-aligned pathway, leaving little room for leadership. 

In contrast, Korea’s Constitutional Court has signaled a stronger commitment to climate accountability than the political establishment. In August 2024, the Constitutional Court issued a landmark ruling recognizing the right to a clean and healthy environment as a constitutional right and directing the government to take stronger action on climate change. The decision, remarkable for a traditionally conservative court, affirmed that climate inaction is not merely a policy choice but a legal violation of citizens’ rights. 

The target range for the 2035 NDC creates legal ambiguity. While the ruling requires quantifiable targets and pathways for achieving 2050 carbon neutrality, stakeholders could easily default to the lowest figure, minimizing legal risk while undermining the Court’s intent. National Assembly member Wang-jin Seo recently noted that this approach risks weakening the legal force of the goal and bypassing constitutional obligations. The government must therefore commit to at least a 61% reduction and resist using the lower bound of its target range as cover for inaction. 

During the recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Gyeongju, South Korea underscored the government’s desire to project itself as a regional driver of sustainable and inclusive growth. But its wavering NDC ambition risks sending conflicting signals to markets and investors. Without a clear direction, Korea could undermine confidence in its green transition, particularly its role in emerging industries such as AI, semiconductors, and offshore wind, where climate ambition and technological leadership increasingly go hand in hand. 

Korea was once an early contender in clean technologies, particularly in battery manufacturing and solar power. However, inconsistent policy direction and limited domestic deployment have eroded that early advantage. Meanwhile, countries like China maintained steady support for clean energy and are now reaping the benefits, rapidly scaling renewables and driving down technology costs. If Korea continues to delay its energy transition and send mixed signals to markets, it risks repeating the same mistake: losing both competitiveness and credibility in the global clean economy. 

This ambiguous stance on climate responsibility is not new. While South Korea consistently ranks within the top 15 economies, the UNFCCC still classifies South Korea as a “non-Annex I” country, placing it in the same category as developing nations that do not have the same economic power. This outdated classification has long allowed Korea to avoid taking on the obligations of developed countries, dampening its willingness to lead climate action or address the transboundary impacts of its industries. 

A credible climate plan requires more than incremental targets. South Korea must align its NDC with the 1.5°C goal and redirect public subsidies away from destructive industries toward genuine decarbonization and nature-positive investment. Unless the government raises its ambition and delivers a clear pathway to 61% cuts, South Korea could leave COP30 not as a leader shaping the region’s climate future, but as a follower watching it unfold.